The process whereby Indians shifted from being external to Euroamerican society to being incorporated within it was piecemeal and drawn out. In Anglophone North America, it spanned three centuries, the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth, extending from the era of the Powhatan Confederacy to that of Wounded Knee. On the passing of the frontier, US Indian affairs discourse shifted from international relations -the fledgling republic's initial foreign policy having been treaties with Indian tribes -to a depoliticised arena of domestic administration. The settler colonial logic of elimination in its crudest frontier form, a violent rejection of all things Indian, was transformed into a paternalistic mode of governmentality which, though still sanctioned by state violence, came to focus on assimilation rather than rejection. Invasion became bureaucratised, a paper-trail of tears that penetrated Indian life in the form of Bureau of Indian Affairs 1 officials rather than the US Cavalry. The twin centrepieces of the post-frontier assimilation campaign were allotment, whereby tribal patrimonies were to be split up into individually-owned plots that allotted Indian proprietors could transfer to White people, and blood quanta, the distinctively BIA style of racial arithmetic whereby Indian identity became correspondingly apportioned. In combination, allotment and blood quanta sought to destroy tribal governance and break up the tribal estate.
For all its domesticity, however, the internalised identity politics of the post-frontier era retained the inherently international concept of the treaty, a uniquely Indian legacy that continues to mark Indigenous peoples' extended historical transition from externality to interiority to Euroamerican society. No other social group in the USA has treaties, a fact that categorically distinguishes Indians from other subjugated groups ('races', 'minorities', 2 etc.) whose different historical experiences are effaced under the levelling rubric of multiculturalism. To register this uniqueness as part of a wider call for antiracist and anticolonial solidarities to be based on the recognition of historical differences, 3 this article will seek to express the divergent styles of eliminationism whereby Indians' progressive containment within the federal body politic was inscribed and managed in US Indian policy.
An alternative to either exterminating or absorbing the Natives was geographical removal -the Natives stayed Natives, only somewhere else. This alternative was less satisfactory than assimilation because it was temporary. Sooner or later, the frontier caught up with the new tribal boundaries and the process had to start all over again. On the other hand, removal was considerably faster than the incremental procedure of assimilation -at least, in assimilation's biological aspect, which required a minimum of one generation. Cultural assimilation could be effected more quickly. Thus, in the wake of the straightforward violence of territorial dispossession, we encounter a range of concurrent settler strategies that blur into one another, spatial removal overlapping with biocultural assimilation in a domestic context in which Natives continue to be subject to disproportionate levels of violence. To chart Indians' progressive containment, therefore, the following analysis will seek to characterise some of the ways in which these Downloaded by [174. 118.228 .12] at 20:48 11 December 2017 complementary settler strategies segue into and reinforce one another in post-frontier US Indian policy.
Constitutionally, the status of Indian tribes or nations was defined by the US Supreme Court in 1831 in the case of Cherokee v. Georgia. In that landmark judgement, Chief Justice John Marshall enunciated the twin concepts of wardship and domestic dependent nationhood on which the relationship between Indian tribes and the federal government was founded, as it remains founded. As I argue elsewhere, Cherokee v. Georgia, in combination with the other two of the Marshall court's so-called Indian judgements, Johnson v. McIntosh (1823) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832), adapted the monarchical doctrine of discovery to the still-emergent republican environment. 4 For our present purposes, the two core principles that animated the doctrine of discovery were: first, the imbalance between the diminished right of territorial possession or occupancy that it assigned to Natives and the overarching dominion that it assigned to European sovereigns; and, second, the fact that discovery, along with the law of nations as a whole, concerned relations between European sovereigns rather than between Europeans and Natives. 5 In combination, these two principles provided for an inferior form of Native title that remained extinguishable at will by the discovering sovereign. In contrast to the form of property right that the doctrine made available to Europeans, Indian occupancy was detachable from title. Fee simple in the United States, as in other settler colonies, remains traceable to a grant from a European (or Euroamerican) sovereign. Property starts where Indianness stops. 6 These principles were translated into the language of republican jurisprudence by the Marshall court, in particular in its bedrock concept of domestic dependent nationhood. In this concept, the first two terms, 'domestic' and 'dependent' defuse and diminish the sovereign implications of the third term, 'nation'. Marshall had no alternative but to concede the juridical status of nationhood to the Cherokee, who were attempting to bring a case against the state of Georgia, since the federal government had engaged in treaties with them, treaty-making being an inherently international procedure. In this inescapably sovereign context, the domestic and dependent qualifications so diminished the status of Indian nationhood that, in contrast to foreign nations, the Cherokee were not even allowed to take their case to the Supreme Court, to which only US citizens and foreign nations could bring complaints. In 1831, then, with treaties based on the concept of domestic dependent nationhood, the shift from international relations to internal administration was firmly established. Thus we can begin to address the complementarity between early-nineteenth century treaties, which principally functioned to remove Indians from territory that was coveted by White people, to the late-nineteenth century assimilation campaign, which sought to incorporate Indians into White society.
INDIAN REMOVAL
Indian removal presupposed an unclaimed space in which the dispossessed could be relocated. The concept of Indian country goes back at least as far as the Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued in the wake of the French and Indian (or Six Years) War, which, in addition to constituting Quebec as British, established the first boundary line (roughly, the crest of the Appalachians) between British colonial territory and Indian country. 7 As such, the Royal Proclamation constitutes the first specification of a bounded zone, beyond the limits of colonial settlement, that belonged generically to Indians.
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The mere fact of official zoning did not, of course, restrain the activities of landgrabbers and speculators, so the push to extinguish Indians' tenure over one part of the country generated a need to safeguard their tenure over another. In a 1789 report to Congress, Secretary at War Henry Knox recommended that the intrusion of White people into Indian territory could be 'regulated' by establishing colonies of Indians that would be protected by troops. 17 Through all these profound developments, the foreign-affairs idiom of national sovereignty continued to characterise treatymaking.
A recurrent feature of removal treaties was allotment, whereby certain tribal members would stay behind and, as proprietors of individual parcels of land, become agriculturalists. Ideologically, allotment furnished an answer to critics who complained that removal was oppressive. More immediately, it also provided a way for White traders to recover debts incurred by individual Indians, who could not offer tribal land in settlement. 18 White officials assumed that allotment would encourage voluntary removal: allottees would sell their plots in order join tribal fellows who had moved west.
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'President Jackson and his advisers were caught off guard, therefore', commented Ronald Satz, 'when thousands of Choctaws decided to take advantage of the allotment provisions and become homesteaders and American citizens in Mississippi'. 20 This was not how nomads were meant to behave. The prospect of improvable Indians undermined a hereditarian justification for removal, whereby Indians' incurable savagery made it impossible for Whites to coexist with them. In keeping with the Lockean narrative informing the wider discourse of discovery, a stubborn incapacity for agriculture was central to this savagery. 21 So far as many Indians in the South were concerned, there was a contradiction in all this, as the oxymoron 'civilized tribes' attested. These Indians had been agriculturalists for millennia. They had taught White people to grow corn and tobacco. In return, White people had taught them the wandering ways of the sylvan romance, which they had been obliged to learn rather quickly as a consequence of having their homes and crops burned by landhungry invaders. Anthropologist Gerald Sider has illustrated the depth and tenacity of this potent ideological inversion. Recalling his distress at witnessing young Lumbee men lining up to volunteer as scouts in Vietnam, a group who suffered one of the highest mortality rates in field combat, Sider reflected on the irony of these descendants of expelled agriculturalists identifying with the wandering forest life that settler ideology had exchanged for their gardens: 'What these Indian children often said, before they went off to their doom, was a pack of self-assertive, self-destructive, imposed and claimed lies: We Indians have special abilities to move silently through the forest; we Indians have special skills as scouts and as hunters -we Indians will show them'. 22 Nomadism naturalised removal. The image of the wandering Indian, forever passing through, endlessly surveying the horizon, attenuated Indians' acknowledged ties to land, assuaging the violence that removal did to common-sense understandings of property. People who were routinely on the move would not be unduly inconvenienced. Noting that settlers had uprooted themselves to remove from Europe, Jackson rhetorically asked if it was to be supposed that 'the wandering savage has a stronger attachment to his home than the settled, civilized Christian?'. 23 In this connection, no problem arose when Indians behaved like Whites. Nor did they merely vacate their own homelands. In resettling across the Mississippi, removing tribes acted as proxy Whites in relation to the peoples who already lived there, who were beginning to feel the game-depletion that settler encroachment occasioned. 24 To acquire territory that it could exchange for the land that removing tribes were relinquishing in the South (which was rapidly becoming the SouthEast), the US government solicited treaties with the Osage and other Plains societies in the West. 25 Being only too aware of the provocative impact of alien incursions, the Chickasaw had a clause included in the first section of their 1834 removal treaty obliging the US to protect them from the traditional owners of their new home across the Mississippi. 26 Crueller still was the irony whereby
Cherokee who had earlier removed to Arkansas at Jefferson's urging found their new country threatened, 25 years on, by an influx of Eastern Cherokee who had initially chosen to stay but who, by 1834, were facing forcible removal. 27 In an abortive treaty that the Western Cherokee signed with their Indian agent, they were promised that there would be no new arrivals unless extra land were provided. The Stokes commissioners at Fort Gibson refused to submit this treaty to the War Department. 28 An immediate spur to removal was provided by a landmark in Indian civility, the Constitution of the Cherokee Nation. 29 Abel summarised the gathering transformation that this initiative consolidated: 'It was not enough [for the Cherokee] to have their own alphabet, their own printing press, their own churches and schools, their own laws, regulating public and private relations, they must have a republican form of government'. 30 Meeting in New Echota, the Cherokee constituent assembly made its decision to draft a national constitution on July 4th 1827, a day whose progressive connotations could hardly have been stronger. The procedure did not take long, the new constitution being so closely modelled on that of the United States that it was drawn up and ratified by the end of the month. 31 Rather than showing the hostile Georgia government that they were worthy neighbours, however, the new constitution was taken as final proof that the Cherokee had no intention of leaving of their own accord. Persuasion having failed, the Georgia legislators hardened their commitment to compulsion. however, the Cherokee's days were numbered.
As indicated, though the Indian removal program was spatial in essence, it also inscribed a hardening cultural pessimism: not only were Indians and Whites unable to live together; they would remain so. 34 This increasingly hereditarian perspective was not a spontaneous theoretical departure from Enlightenment-style environmentalism but a symptom of impatience with the civilising process (two centuries earlier, a similar shift had hardened Puritan attitudes in the wake of the Pequot War 35 ). Indians were surrendering their homelands too slowly. According to this hereditarian narrative, Indians' refractory condition allowed two possibilities: either they could cease to be Indians -i.e., assimilate or die -or they could remove. 36 As a Chickasaw treaty negotiator summed up the choice presented to Indians, they could either stay behind, lose their name and language, and become White, or they could cross the Mississippi and lose their homeland. 37 These alternatives existed in each other's shadow. Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson were principally responsible for bringing them together. In 1817, when removal and assimilation were explicitly linked in treaty bargaining, General Jackson recalled a talk that President Jefferson had given to the Cherokee eight years previously. As an inducement to the tribe to exchange its land for land in Arkansas, Jefferson had offered those who did not want to go West the option of staying behind, only on 640-acre individual allotments rather than on tribal land. 38 The idea was to prove consequential. Returning to it in 1817, Jackson posed the alternatives of remaining tribal and removing or remaining on traditional land in an untraditional way, as holders of individual allotments subject to state law. As Michael Rogin observed, these alternatives 'shared an underlying identity'. 39 Either way, as Indians, Indians would lose their land.
The proposition that removal and assimilation are two sides of the same coin is at odds with an influential view of them as antithetical. According to Charles Wilkinson and Eric Biggs, for instance, 'Virtually all federal Indian policy can be analysed in terms of the tension between assimilation and separatism'. 40 Analogously,
Wilkinson and Biggs' fellow legal scholar Nancy Carter distinguished between an 'early posture of nonassimilation' which treated Indian tribes 'as entities to be dealt with by treaty' and a later policy era in which Indians were individually targeted 'as citizens to be brought under the laws of the nation'. 41 This perspective is not confined to legal scholarship. Thus no less a historian than Mary Young could cite a 'dilemma both whites and Indians have faced as to whether segregation or assimilation should be the proximate strategy or ultimate fate of the native American' as evidence for her controversial claim that 'The Yamasee have vanished'. 42 Admittedly, assimilatory measures came to predominate after treaty-making was abolished in 1871. By that stage, however, there was little vacant land left beyond the penumbra of White settlement, so, of the two strategies, only assimilation remained viable. When this happened, most Indians could no longer be moved on to free up their land for White appropriation. They could, however, be moved in to free up their land for White appropriation, embarking on the path to citizenship through becoming the individual proprietors of alienable allotments. In view of the positive valorisation attaching to citizenship, it is not surprising that this complementarity should be mistaken for tension. But this is to confuse Indians' historical experience in US society with that of Black people.
Viewed in the context of Black American history, Indian removal might seem to represent a fulfilment of the exclusionist dream underlying the colonisation movement and Jim Crow. It would be hard to find a more thoroughgoing form of segregation than one in which, rather than being restricted to particular locations and public facilities, people were actually hidden over the horizon, beyond any form of contact. Yet this makes no sense of the objection, made in relation to reservations, that they separated Indians from membership of US society. This is what assimilationists opposed to Indian sovereignty would urge in the twentieth century, during the dark days of allotment and tribal termination. 43 Yet these champions of Indian equality were not generally notable for extending the argument to the condition of African Americans. In stark contrast to the segregation of the formerly enslaved, the spatial removal of Indians was an inherently temporary expedient, adopted pending their absorption. The difference is very clear: The exploitation of Black people did not require their equality. Negro citizenship did not enlarge the national estate. By contrast, a contradiction of assimilationism was that Indians' elimination was routinely hampered by the success with which they had been able to mimic the ways of White people. Premised on Indian recalcitrance, removal was vulnerable to their civility. Thus it is no accident that, regardless of the profound sociocultural differences distinguishing them, the programme's primary targets (the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek and Seminole peoples) should find themselves collectively designated 'The Five Civilized Tribes' in Euroamerican parlance.
There was a distinctively Edenic cast to the predicament of civility. 44 Indians who tasted the fruit of civilisation lost their innocence, gaining cunning rather than knowledge. This perverse approximation to whiteness lent itself to the idiom of heredity. A key feature of assimilationist rhetoric was its systematic confusion of genetic and cultural criteria. To become civilised, Indians had to become White, and vice versa. Accordingly, a political problem could arise when Indians became too White. In 1816, for instance, Jackson complained of the 'designing half-breeds and renegade white men' who had encouraged Chickasaw reluctance to cede land. 45 When
Indians invoked the vocabulary of American freedom, their impertinence could be put down to European ancestry. 46 No one was more subject to this reproach than John Ross, the Cherokee leader who, as hostile Whites never tired of pointing out, was of largely Scottish biological extraction. 47 50 To retain their leadership, the old chiefs offered to remove. The local Indian agent approved, reporting to the government, in terms that could hardly express the affinity between assimilation and removal more succinctly, that 'the greater part of the full Bloods would follow, and the half breeds could be made full citizens'. 51 The key contradiction of civility was that it lifted Indians out of prehistory and inserted them into the future. Elimination was inherently chronological -whether dead, removed or assimilated, Indians would pass into memory. Euroamerican time, as Benjamin Lee Whorf put it, flows out of a future, through a present and into a past. 52 Correspondingly, as their nomadic condition attested, Indians were deemed impervious to linear temporality. Nomadism was not only conducive to removal. Nomads were bound into the realm of disappearance at a deeper level, subsisting on dwindling indigenous resources whose reproduction was finite. Agriculture, by contrast, in common with the Cherokee's progressive Constitution, staked a claim on the future. As individuals, Indians would not disrupt the forward flow of Euroamerican history, the time of the nation -not merely because they could be relied on to sell their private plots but more profoundly because, as individuals, they would cease being Indian. Detribalised, they would merge into settler society, the challenge that they presented to the rule of private property evaporating as surely as removing tribes evaporated into the West. Heredity -the reproach of hybridity -could be invoked to disguise this transformation, substituting phenotype for social type.
On the face of it, the genealogical inauthenticity that was alleged of Ross and others might seem to have anticipated the Dawes-era blood-quantum discourse that we shall encounter below. But this would be to mistake surface detail for historical motivation. There is a fundamental difference between ancestral slurs intended to discredit Ross's personal intransigence and a genetic calculus that would seek to destroy tribal organisation through impartially assimilating Indians as Indians, a blanket category that would be impervious to personal demeanour or affiliation. The adoption of this strategy into national policy would mark the closure of the frontier, culminating the long-run process whereby Indians' relationship with settler society shifted from one of externality to one of interiority. Once the territory bounded by Mexico, Canada, the Atlantic and the Pacific had been effectively settled, the only space left available for expansion was within, a condition that rendered the frontier coterminal with reservation boundaries. 53 Prior to this development, however, space had provided an alternative to race, banishment across the frontier (or, later, confinement to reservations) providing favoured techniques of elimination. Consider, for instance, Article 3 of the treaty that the Ponca were induced to sign before being removed (for the first time) in 1858:
The Ponca being desirous of making provision for their half-breed relatives, it is agreed that those who prefer and elect to reside among them shall be permitted to do so, and be entitled to and enjoy all the rights and privileges of members of the tribe, but to those who have chosen and left the tribe to reside among the whites and follow the pursuits of civilized life Here, in the antebellum era, for Ponca who choose to stay behind (named members of the Métis elite through whose good offices the treaty had been arranged), core elements of the fin-de-siécle Dawes programme are already in place: individuals assimilate into White society by means of allotments while the tribe ceases to obstruct White access to its homeland.
One aspect of the Ponca treaty does, however, stand out in contradistinction to the later Dawes regime. Though mixedbloodedness is an operator (in that it denotes those eligible for assimilation), it lacks implications for tribal membership. Here we begin to see the relationship, which the following sections will explore, between blood quantum discourse -which is to say, race discourse in its specifically Indian application -and the internalisation of Indian societies. The Ponca whose mixedbloodedness was without consequence were those who remained external by virtue of consenting to remove. Externally, the US government's Indian problem was a tribal one. Assimilating individual members would not make tribal territory, which was collectively held, available (indeed, it could have the reverse effect, since treaty negotiators regularly relied on 'mixed-blood' elites to secure tribal acceptance of treaties 55 ). Moreover, for treaty purposes, it was in the US's interest for tribes to be composite. Breaking them down into smaller units would only necessitate additional treaties. Prior to internalisation, in other words, the US government relied on the very tribal governments that it would subsequently seek to dismantle. At this stage, White ancestry could be cited to impugn uncooperative leaders such as McGillivray or Ross, while the presence of White or Black elements in a tribe's make-up could be seen to aggravate the military threat that it posed, as in the case of the Seminole. 56 But such assertions were part of the polemics of removal, aimed at the leaders' refusal to sign treaties rather than at their putative somatic make-up. Over the frontier, neither civility nor mixed-bloodedness posed a problem -even Jackson had not minded a Cherokee Constitution operating in Oklahoma. 57 Once a tribe was internalised, however, its government constituted an obstacle that frustrated the US government's access to individual Indians. The impediment to assimilating tribes into the body politic was not simply that they were collective groupings, since the United States encompassed other collectivities -in particular, of course, the states themselves but also, from late-century on, corporations. 58 Rather, tribes were inassimilable because they were heteronomously constituted entities whose organising principles were discordant with those that governed the structurally regular institutions of US society, which were uniformly constituted around the centrality of private property. Thus the obstacle to the Indian Territory's admission to statehood was not its demographics but its commitment to collective ownership. 59 Indians were the original communist menace.
To appreciate the deeper commonality linking the ostensibly contrary policies of segregation and assimilation, we shall shift into the post-frontier era to consider a campaign that, on the face of it, would seem to represent Indian removal's antithesis. Rather than displacing Indians somewhere else, the allotment policy sought to connect each individual Indian to a fixed parcel of land. Once the commonality between the policies of Indian removal and allotment in severalty has become clear, we will consider the affinity linking these explicitly territorial policies to the manifestly corporeal discourse of blood quanta.
GENERAL ALLOTMENT
Understood as an internal correlate to removal, allotment exhibits many of the same characteristics. Like removal, it detached Indians from their land, enabling the US government to extinguish tribal title to it. This occurred because individual allotments, which were usually of 160 acres, were of smaller expanse than a pro rata division of tribal territory would have yielded. Before allottees could begin to sell their plots, therefore, the government had already appropriated the surplus. Moreover, as Cole Harris has observed, capitalism benefited doubly from allotment, 'acquiring access to land freed by small reserves and to cheap labour detached from land'. 60 Allotment also marked a refusal of collective organisation. 'A protected Indian title to land', enthused the Indian Rights Association in 1885, two years before the passage of the allotment legislation that it championed, 'is the entering-wedge by which tribal organization is to be rent asunder'. Such cases were admittedly rare. On the founding of the new Republic, however, enthusiasm for the procedure mounted, with allotment being pressed on Indians from Washington's time on. 65 Treaties provided for allotments in the early period of the Republic, 66 though the private-property dimension was not necessarily expected to apply in the short term. Under Article 4 of the 1820 Choctaw treaty of Doak's Stand, which became a model for removal, it was agreed that the tribal boundaries that the treaty established would remain unaltered (and on the east side of the Mississippi river) 'until the period at which said nation shall become so civilized and enlightened, as to be made citizens of the United States, and Congress shall lay off a limited parcel of land for the benefit of each family or individual in the nation'. 67 In the same year, the Indian agent for the Osage recommended allotments of 160 to 640 acres. 68 These proportions would become familiar. 69 Over the following three decades, allotment provisions continued to be common but were not uniformly specified. From mid-century on, however, in Vine Deloria and David Wilkins' words, 'the full weight of government' was brought to bear on 'the idea of allotting Indian lands and bringing individual Indian families into the small town/family farm way of life'. 70 Between 1853 and 1856, as Indian Commissioner George
Manypenny reported, over 50 treaties were negotiated, the majority of which provided for allotment in severalty. 71 In later life, vainly counselling against the Dawes legislation, a repentant Manypenny recorded that, in dissolving the tribal relation and encouraging allotment and citizenship, 'thus making the road clear for the rapacity of the white man', he had acted in good faith: 'Had I known then, as I know now, what would result from those treaties', however, 'I would be compelled to admit that I had committed a high crime'. 72 After the Civil War, the focus of Indian dispossession switched to the Plains, where removal morphed into the cognate policy of reservation. 73 As Robert Trennert has observed, the early reservation policy, which sought to protect White travellers, was necessitated by the fact that the more mobile people of the Plains (who 'moved easily from one location to another, had no permanent villages or agricultural fields for whites to destroy, and were usually able to choose between battle or retreat as the situation demanded' 74 ) needed to be handled differently. Through this shift, however, the strategic essentials remained the same. To exchange the buffalo road for the cow road, Plains Indians had to be 'settled on fixed reservations, since only then could their tribal land be assigned to individuals'. 75 There was one major difference between allotment and removal, however. Whatever treaties may have provided, and regardless of Indian agents' promises, the proponents of removal saw it as a transitional device. A creature of the frontier, removal was also short-lived as a bounded historical phase. To put Jefferson's idea into practice required the existence of territory that was included in the United States but still unclaimed by its citizens. Outside New Orleans and its environs, most of the vast swathe of Indian land, dotted with forts and trading posts, that the United States had acquired through the Louisiana Purchase was rawly discovered by the French and/or the Spanish and not yet appropriated by White people. Indeed, the commissioning of Lewis and Clark's expedition to map the unknown territory between the Mississippi and the Pacific demonstrated just how inchoate was the sovereignty that the nation had bought from Napoleon. 76 With the instantaneity of discovery, the Louisiana Purchase theoretically doubled the size of the nation. In the space thus opened up, removal mediated between dominion and possession, exchanging native title for a contractual substitute that obtained under the legal system of the United States. Excisions, repeat removals and the enforced sharing of territory granted more than once by different treaties were the practical face of removal's temporariness, which kept time with the westward march of the nation. Allotment was increasingly offered as an alternative to this demoralising cycle. In the end, it became the only alternative. There was a limit to the West, which was anyway moving in from the Pacific as well, and this imposed a final limit on removal and reservation.
Territorial expansion could override the most cherished of ideological objectives. This not only applied to Indians. When large expanses beckoned, even Jefferson and Jackson's hallowed yeoman farmer could be hustled out of the way by absentee speculators.
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Displaced by speculators, many smallholders found themselves steered into manufacturing industry to provide a market for the agricultural surplus. Jackson's manufacturing-oriented 'tariff of abominations' maintained this industry. 78 Young documented how, in the wake of Indian removal, Jacksonian policies favoured speculators over settlers. Driven to recoup the cost of removal, the government 'made a consistent practice of offering more land for sale each year than could possibly be purchased [by settlers... This] threw large areas into the market before many settlers had realized enough from their crops to purchase their claims'. 79 The frontier was led from behind.
On the passing of the frontier, removal lost its function. Not so allotment. Rather, the demise of removal meant that assimilation was the only one of these complementary strategies to remain viable, a situation that was congenial to the renewed currency of environmentalist ideology. 80 As the primary instrument of assimilation, the allotment program intensified accordingly. Allotment focused on the individual, whom it not only stripped of land. Increasingly, it also sought to strip individuals of their Indian identity. In seeking to produce assimilable individuals, the programme sought to eliminate a collectivity that was separately constituted from and not contained within the bounds of the social contract that Europeans had imported with them. Indians would become White in a way that went beyond colour. The key attribute was individuality. Over the frontier, the US government's primary unit of Indianness had been the tribe. The number of individuals comprising it had been secondary. What had counted was the tribal domain, which was collectively held. Treaties exchanged this for land that was as yet uncoveted by Whites, sometimes breaking individual parcels down into allotments that could smooth the path of removal (initially, as an inducement to signatories). 81 In the post-frontier era, however, when eliminatory discourse focused exclusively inwards, beneath the tribal surface to the individual Indian below, the numbers became crucial. The discourse of elimination came to focus on the reduction of Indians as Indians, rather than on the geographic displacement of Indian tribes.
Allotment, in sum, had two inseparable ends: the abolition of tribal government and the assimilation of the individual Indian. It was not so much an alternative to removal as its completion. Thus we do not encounter it in isolation, as simply a form of land tenure. Rather, allotment was invoked as a universal antidote for all things Indian. The erasure of Indianness was generally depicted contractually, as a kind of reciprocity. Jefferson's version of reciprocity was an exchange: land for civilisation ('what they can spare and we want, for what we can spare and they want' 82 ). Jefferson instructed his Indian superintendent that, where the prospect of civilisation offered inadequate inducement, more tangible considerations might tempt Indians into debt, which they could discharge with their land. 83 Jackson, characteristically, was more direct, extending the principle of individual allotment to the payment of tribal annuities that were due under treaties. The intention was 'to reduce the power of Native leaders and to prevent the establishment of tribal treasuries by such nations as the Cherokees' -who, as Michael Green goes on to note, were currently engaged in preparing the case of Cherokee v. Georgia. 84 In terms of directness, however, few exchanges can compare with General Sanborn's offer of allotments to the Arapo and Cheyenne in compensation for the Sand Creek massacre. 85 Later in the century, proponents of the Dawes Act were hardly less calculating. Colonel Richard Pratt estimated that allotted Indians could be assimilated in a mere three to five years so long as they were evenly spread (which would 'only make nine Indians to a county throughout the United States' 86 There was not a pauper in the Nation, and the Nation did not owe a dollar. It built its own capitol […] and it built its schools and its hospitals. Yet the defect of the system was apparent. They have got as far as they can go, because they own their land in common […] There is no selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilization. Till this people will consent to give up their lands, and divide them among their citizens so that each can own the land he cultivates, they will not make much more progress. 90 The paradox of civility apart, Dawes' remark reveals a feature of allotment that Jefferson had recognised: Indians' civilisation would come after, rather than before, their loss of land. 91 The civilising process produced a faster rate of land acquisition than had previously been achieved by military means. In the half century from 1881, the total acreage held by Indians in the United States fell by two thirds, from just over 155 million acres to just over 52 million.
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A consequence was the emergence of another feature of civilisation: class. As D'Arcy McNickle, who knew first-hand, observed: 'In each allotted reservation a class of landless, homeless individuals came into existence and, having no resources of their own, doubled up with relatives and intensified the poverty of all'. 93 The bare figures only tell part of the story, since the land that Indians did manage to retain was disproportionately marginal or useless for agricultural purposes. 94 Accordingly, the idea that there is tension between the strategies of assimilating Indians and of either removing or segregating them misses the fundamental reality that, as settler colonialism, all Indian policy is subordinate to the overriding imperative of territorial acquisition. As we have just seen, beneath the manifest disparity between removal, which separated Indians from their land, and allotment, which assigned Indians to individual portions of land, there lay a deeper policy continuity. When we investigate the post-frontier discourse of blood quanta, the reverse is the case. Here, an apparent continuity is deceptive, since the separating out of particular 'half-breeds' for special treatment in nineteenth-century treaties actually served a different purpose from the racial arithmetic that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century in the course of implementing the Dawes-era programme of Indian assimilation that centred on general allotment. In this case, the appearance of continuity should not distract us from the wholesale shift in the techniques of Indian elimination that the passing of the frontier inaugurated. The final boundary of the Indian domain was Indianness itself, persisting within every individual who remained Indian. In the end, blood quanta crossed even this boundary, allotting the Indianness beneath the skin. To round off our survey of ways in which a variety of settler colonial strategies supplemented one another in post-frontier US Indian policy, therefore, we turn now to the ostensibly non-territorial strategy of blood quantum requirements.
BLOOD QUANTA
In the wake of the frontier, it made little difference whether Indians had been removed to other tribes' homelands or confined to a portion of their own. They were on reservations, and there was nowhere else to put them. Thus treaties could no longer serve the purpose of converting Indian homelands into so many parts of the United States. As such, they were historically as well as strategically temporary. A Turneresque outgrowth of expansion, the treaty was endemic to the nineteenth century. The end of the frontier received symbolic, if slightly premature, expression on 3 March, 1871, when Congress resolved that: 'No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty'. 95 The era of treaty-making with Indian tribes was formally over. This is not to say that the years 1870 and 1872 can be distinguished by a hiatus in the conduct of Indian affairs. In the historical long-run, however, as a marker of the final internalisation of Indian societies, the importance of the end of treaty-making can hardly be overstated. In driving a wedge between Indian affairs and international law, the 1871 act consolidated the Cherokee v. Georgia judgement. Through being rendered internal, the Indian problem was discursively reconstituted as administrative rather than political.
In the three or four decades after treaty-making was discontinued, the BIA demonised the tribal governments it had previously relied on to deliver treaties and focused on the improvable individual, whose individuality corresponded to a particular fragment of the tribal estate. The outcome was a two-way loss whereby culture and biology supplemented each other. As Senator Higgins put it in Congress: 'It seems to me one of the ways of getting rid of the Indian question is just this of intermarriage, and the gradual fading out of the Indian blood; the whole quality and character of the aborigine disappears, they lose all of the traditions of the race'. 96 Culturally, through what Lewis Meriam, author of the scathing report that heralded the end of the allotment programme, sarcastically dubbed 'the magic in individual ownership of property', Indians would be coopted out of the tribe, which would be depleted accordingly, and into White society. 97 With every man his own chief, there would be no more Indians. Culture, biology and territoriality converged on the modern discourse of blood quanta, which originated in the 1890s in the immediate context of implementing general allotment. Once federal reservation managers were required to register tribal members for the purpose of allocating individual land holdings under the Dawes legislation, the catch-all 'half-breed' category, which had previously served as an indiscriminate designator of genetic admixture, began to acquire mathematical refinement. Five years after the Dawes Act, Indian Affairs Commissioner T. J. Morgan distinguished this increasing refinement from the less exacting quantifications of the preceding era: 'under date of July 5, 1856, Attorney-General Cushing expressed the opinion […] that half-breeds (and in his opinion he seems to use the expressions half-breeds and mixed-bloods interchangeably), should be treated by the executive as Indians in all respects so long as they retain their tribal relations'. As if to mark the transitional moment, however, Morgan went on to observe, in the very style he had just deprecated in Cushing, that: 'One of the most intelligent Indians known in the history of our dealings with the Indians was John Ross, a Cherokee chief, who was a half-breed'. 98 As a technique of elimination, assimilation is more effective than either homicide or a spatial device. Unlike homicide, it does not jeopardise settler social order, since the policy is invariably presented, in philanthropic terms, as offering Natives the same opportunities as are available to Whites. In the post-frontier era, a too-public reliance on earlier, more direct modes of elimination would have conflicted with the establishment and legitimation of the rule of law among a diverse and potentially unruly immigrant populace that was still in the making. Correspondingly, unlike the spatial techniques of removal and/or confinement, assimilation is seen as permanent and not susceptible to the settler land-hunger that sooner or later arrives at the boundaries of the Native enclave. Above all, though, assimilation is total. In neutralising a seat of consciousness, it eliminates a competing sovereignty. Confined Natives, relatives and descendants of killed Natives, remember their dispossession. That memory inscribes the foundational violence of settler democracy. Assimilated Natives, by contrast, do not even exist. There are only White people, settlers, bereft of memory. 99 Or so might the Native Administrator's wish be fulfilled. Natives can see things -and, more to the point, act on things -in other ways. 100 Resistance can, however, be counterproductive, as in the case of those who boycotted the Dawes allotment rolls and thereby disinherited their descendants. 101 The allotment policy was formally discontinued by the New Deal reforms associated with John Collier's dynamic stint as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, which enshrined the principle of tribal self-government. To its undeniable credit, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act put an end to the catastrophic process of tribal allotment and returned surplus tribal lands that had yet to be sold off. It also curtailed the sale of tribal assets to outsiders. In addition, the act and related legislation vouchsafed Indians' freedom of religion and speech, established a fairer criminal justice system on reservations and provided funds for land acquisition and economic development, among other improvements. 102 All this came at a price, however. Collier's vision for tribal organisation reflected his own Pueblo romance, a 'Red Atlantis' that he had discovered during a sojourn in New Mexico in the early 1920s. In Robert Berkhofer's words, the Pueblos became Collier's 'personal countercultural utopia'. 103 Nonetheless, tribes that reorganised under the act found themselves adopting a distinctly Western style of governance by way of the BIA's model constitutions. 104 Though the act ostensibly abandoned the campaign to assimilate individual Indians, its prescription for reinforcing tribal government was to anglicise it. Constitutions typically introduced tribal elections, specified blood quantum-based membership criteria and included the phrase 'subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior', whereby tribes surrendered final say over expenditure or land use. 105 An indication of the practical substance of the act's version of tribal independence is the fact that the reforms were to be administered by the BIA, the single organisation with most to lose from Indian selfgovernment. When tribal authorities evinced unwillingness to exchange their own political processes for Western-style electoral contestation, Collier sought to replace them with imposed political structures of Interior Department design. Indian resistance was widespread. The objections did not just come from traditionalist diehards. Christianised Indians reacted against the threat of being returned to ways of life that they had repudiated, allotted individuals resisted the idea of surrendering their holdings to the collectivity, Oklahoma tribes 'believed they would have to return their oil wells to tribal governments that existed only as paper organizations', 106 while the Navajo, largest tribe of all, politely heard Collier out and wanted nothing to do with his system. 107 For the Department of the Interior, however, one model fitted all. Ten years after the act had been passed, Assistant Solicitor Charlotte Westwood reported to the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs that the degree of standardisation of tribal constitutions was so 'incredibly high' that the conclusion was warranted that 'these constitutions are nothing more than new Indian Office regulations'. 108 In an important sense, however, the model constitutions were much more than new BIA regulations. Rather, they fundamentally shifted the level of regulation itself. Whereas, in the allotment era, tribal government had been routinely excoriated, there was no suggestion that it was anything other than an alien entity. The programme had been premised on a protean opposition between tribal organisation and US society. In seeking to dismantle that opposition, the Indian Reorganization Act sought to raise the scope of assimilation from the level of the individual to that of the tribe itself. Where Dawes-style assimilation had reconstituted individual Indians as property-owners, and thus sought to eliminate them as Indians, the Indian Reorganization Act reconstituted tribes into structural conformity with White institutions -which is to say, it sought to eliminate them as Indian institutions.
The semblance of tribal consent that had been so important for treaty-making remained central to the process of securing tribal acceptance of the new constitutions, though this did not stop the BIA from defining and circumscribing tribes' powers for them. Bureau interference extended down to a tribe's capacity to define its own membership, a capacity that was usurped by the model constitution's blood-quantum requirement. In response to this requirement, Frank Ducheneaux, leader of the Cheyenne River Sioux, complained that the legislation not only kept Indians under the control of Congress and the Secretary of the Interior but 'limited their sovereign rights which had never been done before formally '. 109 It is important to widen the narrow focus that would confine the Indian Reorganization Act to US national history. Such a focus, which fails to recognise Indians as colonised peoples, merely endorses the post-frontier depoliticisation whereby Indian affairs were relegated from the realm of international relations to that of municipal administration, a phenomenon that we should be analysing rather than reproducing. The context in which the act was introduced was not merely that of the New Deal United States. Globally, it was an era in which White authorities were introducing systems of indirect or delegated governance with a view to assuaging colonial-nationalist sentiment in the colonies. Collier derived inspiration for his model of tribal government, which he even termed 'indirect administration', from Lord Lugard's plan for the indirect rule of British colonies. 110 Rather than fostering national independence, Lugard's intention had been to postpone it indefinitely. Thus it is not surprising that the Indians whom Collier recruited to the scheme should have found themselves in an impossible situation. As Laurence Hauptman has noted, '"Bureau Indians" had been viewed as traitors by many Indians since the days of Carlos Montezuma'. 111 The reconfiguration of tribal governments into structural harmony with Euroamerican institutions was tellingly reflected in a concomitant elaboration of blood-quantum criteria. In April 1934, a few weeks before the passing of the Indian Reorganization Act, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6676, which, for the first time, formally specified a blood requirement (of a quarter-degree, for employment preference with the BIA). 112 Soon afterwards, Section 19 of the act would provide that:
The term 'Indian' as used in this Act shall include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all person who are descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.
113
A major shift has taken place here. Under the Dawes regime, hybridity had furnished a means to fragment the tribe. As of 1 June 1934, however, reservation Indians were no longer segregated into differently-entitled categories. On the contrary, mixed-bloodedness seems to lack implications for tribal membership (though, as we have also seen, the model constitutions would seek to remedy this). Rather than tribal organisation, blood-quantum discourse was now aimed primarily at people living off the reservations, the 'all other persons' who were not 'of one-half or more Indian blood'. This takes us back behind Dawes to the removal era, when, as the Ponca example illustrated, those whose mixed-bloodedness had been without consequence were those who had removed over the frontier.
As we have seen, it had been the Ponca's 'half-breed relatives', forsaking the tribe and living among White people, who had been eligible for allotments. In contrast to the assimilable individual, tribal organisation had been incompatible with the structurally regular institutions of US society, which meant that it had to be removed and, when that option was no longer available, dismantled. In the wake of the frontier, when the inassimilable tribe had been encompassed within White society, mixed-bloodedness came to operate within the confines of the tribe, which it served to break up. 114 Under the Indian Reorganization Act, by contrast -at least, as
Congress passed it, before the BIA took over its implementationmixed-bloodedness ceased to operate within the tribe, which was seen as confined to the space of the reservation. 115 But this is entirely consistent since, at the same time, tribal organisation ceased to be structurally incompatible with the institutions of US society. In other words, as the frontier receded from living memory, the act achieved the same end as removal had previously achieved. It rid US society of the inassimilable features of the tribe.
The Indian Reorganization Act's incorporation of the reconstituted tribe had profound implications for the complex interplay between civic and geographical space that shaped the racialisation of Indian people. As we have seen, when the destruction of tribal organisation was the primary target of US Indian policy, geographical withdrawal from the tribe had been the key step in an individual's assimilation into White society. Once the reformed tribe had been domesticated, however, the anomaly of an Indianness that persisted beyond its boundaries intensified accordingly. At this point, race ceased to operate on the reservation. There being no further need to eliminate an Indianness that had a licensed place, bloodquantum discourse came to focus exclusively on Indianness as it endured off the reservation. All these years on, the abruptness of the reversal still has the capacity to astonish. Consider the following interchange from the House Committee on Indian Affairs' hearing into the Indian Reorganization Bill:
Senator Thomas: Well, if someone could show that they were a descendant of Pocahontas, although they might be only five-hundredth Indian blood, they would come under the terms of this act.
Commissioner Collier: If they are actually residing within the present boundaries of an Indian reservation at the present time. 116 Off the reservation, however, one needed to boast half a degree to qualify. Failing this, blood quanta would continue to declassify Indians as they had earlier done within the tribe. When fivehundredth degree descendants of Pocohantas -or, for that matter, quarter-degree people who had qualified for preferential BIA employment under Roosevelt's Executive Order -passed over the reservation boundary, therefore, they changed colour. Indians with African ancestry turned from Red to Black. So long as they did not possess a single drop of Black blood, other Indians could turn White. Any colour so long as it wasn't Red. There could hardly be a clearer example of race intensifying in White social space. Such anomalies reflect the persistence of settler colonial thinking in the New Deal reforms, which located Indianness in a confined realm that was not merely geographical (the physical space of the reservation). By the same token, the Indian Reorganization Act's incorporation of the tribe into structural conformity with its civic environment culminated the racialisation of Indian people.
There could be no more unstable racial identity than the one that transforms itself, trickster-like, at the reservation gate. Nor could the contrast with the immutability of Blackness be more complete. As I have argued elsewhere, instability -susceptibility to being changed into something else -is a distinctive attribute of Indianness in US settler colonial discourse. 117 In comparison to this extreme, the nineteenth-century savagery that was either located or removable over the frontier was hardly unstable at all -as noted, Indians' incapacity for agriculture figured as irredeemable in removalist propaganda. Subsequently, on the basis of Dawes-era logic, throughout the relentless attack against it, the tribe still incubated an alterity that was contrapuntal to White society. With the Indian Reorganization Act, however, the Indian problem became finally contained. This ultimate end to the frontier, the most territorial of consummations, was inscribed in the language of blood quanta.
CONCLUSION
History cautions us to guard against appearances. As co-products of the settler colonial logic of elimination, removal and assimilation conduce to a common end. By the same token, Indian reservations are not comparable to Jim Crow segregation, any more than land rights are comparable to apartheid. Indeed, the reverse is the case: for all their limitations, reservations and land rights are concessions achieved through anticolonial resistance rather than colonially imposed systems of oppression. Correspondingly, Black Americans' civil-rights era campaign to be included on equal terms with White society promoted a goal -assimilation -that the Native movement in the USA, as in Australia, was premised on rejecting. Indeed, as a number of scholars have noted, the Fifteenth Amendment, fruit of the overthrow of slavery, could theoretically jeopardise Indians' distinctive rights, since these could be interpreted as racially based. 118 The liberal discomfort occasioned by tensions between
Blacks and Indians reflects a universalism that takes for granted a pastiche of difference -colours, races, minorities, ethnicities -on a multicultural canvas which levels the varied histories that produced these differences in the first place. Historically analysed, however, these apparent conflicts of sectional interest emerge as traces of the different but complementary roles into which the conquered populations concerned were co-opted by colonial settlers. In the cases of Indians and Black people in the USA, contemporary differences testify to the distinct historical experiences of territorial expropriation and chattel slavery respectively. These distinct modes of co-optation together subtended the overarching system of Euroamerican settler colonialism, so solidarities should be framed at this more encompassing level. 
